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Chapter 10 




“Finally, we heard Canada say it is sorry.”  
Chief Phil Fontaine, Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, June 13, 2008 
 
Abstract   In this paper, I explore how theorists might navigate a course between 
the twin dangers of piety and excess cynicism when thinking critically about state 
apologies, by focusing on two government apologies to indigenous peoples: name-
ly, those made by the Australian and Canadian Prime Ministers in 2008. Both 
apologies are notable for several reasons: they were both issued by heads of gov-
ernment, and spoken on record within the space of government: the national par-
liaments of both countries. Furthermore, in each case, the object of the apology – 
that which was apologized for – comes closer to disrupting the idea both countries 
have of themselves, and their image in the global political community, than any 
previous apologies made by either government. Perhaps as a result, both apologies 
were surrounded by celebration and controversy alike, and tracing their conse-
quences – even in the short term – is a difficult business. We avoid excessive piety 
or cynicism, I argue, when we take several things into account. First, apologies 
have multiple functions: they narrate particular histories of wrongdoing, they ex-
press disavowal of that wrongdoing, and they commit to appropriate forms of re-
pair or renewal. Second, the significance and the success of each function must be 
assessed contextually. Third, when turning to official political apologies, in par-
ticular, appropriate assessment of their capacity to disavow or to commit requires 
that consider apologies both as performance and as political action. While there 
remain significant questions regarding the practice of political apology – in partic-
ular, its relationship to practices of reparation, forgiveness and reconciliation – 
this approach can provide a framework with which to best consider them. 
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10.1. Introduction 
The year 2008 saw two historic government apologies offered to indigenous peo-
ples, in surprisingly short succession.1 On February 13, newly elected Australian 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd gave an official apology on behalf of his government 
(Rudd 2008) and four months later, on June 8, so did Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper (Harper 2008). These apologies are notable for several reasons: 
they were both issued by heads of government, and both spoken on record within 
the space of government: namely, the national parliaments of both countries. Both 
apologies can be traced to years of indigenous campaigning and lobbying – and in 
the Canadian case, to a series of lawsuits – as well as government-initiated inde-
pendent investigations launched a decade earlier, which strongly recommended 
apology as a measure of reparation to each countries indigenous peoples, and 
whose recommendations had been strongly resisted by the government of the time, 
in each case.2  
The substance of these apologies is also notable: while both refer generally to a 
long history of displacement, appropriation, assimilation, and inequality, they also 
focus on two specific government policies: the Canadian apology is addressed to 
former students of Indian Residential Schools, and the Australian apology reflects 
“in particular on the mistreatment of those who were Stolen Generations”. The 
impact of both policies on indigenous individuals, communities and tribal cultures 
cannot be overestimated. In the Canadian case, the policy was explicitly articulat-
ed as a way to “get rid of the Indian problem” by “killing the Indian in the child.”  
Young children were separated from their families and placed in church-run 
schools, which denied them their language and cultural practices, as well as access 
to the warmth of family and community.  Conditions in these schools were notori-
ously poor, and many suffered from physical and sexual abuse at the hands of 
their so-called ‘civilizers’. Australia’s Stolen Generations have a not dissimilar 
story; government policy was to forcibly remove primarily ‘half-caste’ Aboriginal 
children from Aboriginal families, and place them in orphanages, group homes, or 
                                                            
1 The Canadian apology was directed towards members of the tribes represent-
ed by the political body of the Assembly of First Nations, the Canadian Métis 
peoples and the Canadian Inuit people. The Australian apology identified the Abo-
riginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples by name. The naming of indigenous 
peoples is itself a contested issue, with a history of colonization, misunderstanding 
and racism behind it.  In this paper, I will use ‘aboriginal’ ‘indigenous’ and ‘na-
tive’ interchangeably to describe the first peoples of the territories of present-day 
Canada and Australia, while recognizing that none of these is unproblematic. In 
doing so, I acknowledge the damage of not naming tribes and communities indi-
vidually. 
2 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples; “Bringing them Home”. Both are 
available online: http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/pubs/rpt/rpt-eng.asp#chp6; 
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/Social_Justice/bth_report/report/index.html 
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with white families. The rationale offered was that the plight of Aboriginal peo-
ples was hopeless – they were a dying race – but that half-caste Aboriginals could 
be saved and, indeed, ‘whitened’. As in the Canadian case, there is significant evi-
dence that a culture of physical and sexual abuse permeated the institutions in 
which they were placed. 
The policies and attitudes that led to the Residential Schools and the Stolen 
Generations were undoubtedly racist and colonial. They were also genocidal, as 
defined in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide in 
1948, which lists “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as 
an act of genocide in Article 2. This convention was signed and ratified by both 
countries before either saw fit to cease their domestic policies of indigenous dis-
placement, undermining any potential claim of ignorance regarding the wrongness 
of these policies.  Indeed, the government of Canada did not begin to close a sig-
nificant number of schools until the 1980s, and the last residential school in Cana-
da closed as recently as 1996.3 Moreover, the collective and multigenerational 
traumatic impact of the seizure of children from close-knit communities cannot be 
overestimated. Both cases reflect Claudia Card’s insight into genocide, when she 
notes how it includes “the harm inflicted on its victims’ social vitality… its survi-
vors lose their cultural heritage, and may even lose their intergenerational connec-
tions” (Card 11, 20). The harm inflicted in these cases is not a discrete past harm; 
it is an ongoing one, played out in indigenous communities and families today, as 
the survivors of schools become parents and grandparents to children of their own. 
Native scholar Andrea Smith also argues forcibly for recognizing the role that 
widespread tolerance of sexual violence toward indigenous peoples (including 
children) played in genocidal policies in North America (Smith, 35-54).  Alt-
hough, in most cases, residential schools were run by Canadian churches and not 
by the Canadian state, decision to enact these policies cannot be neatly separated 
from the conditions they created.  
In addressing these policies and acknowledging the attitudes that produced 
them as endemic to and representative of the history of both ‘settler societies’, the 
Canadian and Australian apologies challenge the founding myths of both states. 
That which is apologized for, in both cases, comes closer to disrupting the idea 
both countries have of themselves – and their image in the global political com-
munity – than any previous apologies made by either government. Perhaps as a re-
sult, both apologies were surrounded by celebration and controversy alike, and 
tracing even their short-term consequences is a difficult business.   
Both are excellent examples of the burgeoning global phenomenon of the offi-
cial political apology: that is, an apology offered by political representatives or 
heads of state, on behalf of a political body or state, for wrongs committed in the 
recent or the distant past. What then can we learn about the phenomenon of politi-
                                                            
3 Information about the history of the residential schools is available on the As-
sembly of First Nations website http://www.afn.ca/residentialschools/history.html 
(last accessed March 24, 2010). 
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cal apologies, and how to think about and theorize them, from these two exam-
ples?  
I see two dangers lurking for theorists who try to take up this question.  The 
first is the danger of piety – that is, of being caught up in the solemnity of such 
ceremonial occasions, and the weight of history that they seem to carry. In the face 
of powerful words like ‘reconciliation’ and ‘a new chapter’, daring to critically 
analyze apologies can feel a little like talking in church.4  On the other side sits the 
danger of too-easy cynicism.  Such cynicism dismisses all political apologies as 
cheap, ‘gestural politics’ awash in self-interest and crocodile tears, which enable 
politicians to win public acclaim and diffuse angry minority groups, without 
committing any actual resources to problems of injustice and exclusion (Cunning-
ham 2004). These dangers are magnified by a certain degree of confusion regard-
ing the nature and purpose of official political apologies: that is, what exactly 
qualifies as such, what role they are meant to play or what purpose they accom-
plish, and what criteria or standards exist for distinguishing between better or 
worse instances. Given the kinds of serious and longstanding wrongs for which 
states and governments are called upon to apologize, these questions can seem al-
most unanswerable; it is hard to imagine what could possibly qualify as a good or 
a satisfying apology. 
In this paper, I explore how theorists might navigate a course between piety 
and cynicism in thinking critically about apologies, by focusing on these two gov-
ernment apologies to indigenous peoples. Such a course can be found, I argue, 
when we take several things into account. First, apologies have multiple functions: 
they narrate particular histories of wrongdoing, they express disavowal of that 
wrongdoing, and they commit to appropriate forms of repair or renewal. Second, 
the significance and the success of each function must be assessed contextually.  
Third, when turning to official political apologies, in particular, appropriate as-
sessment of their capacity to disavow or to commit requires that consider apolo-
gies both as performance and as political action. While there remain significant 
questions regarding the practice of political apology – in particular, its relationship 
to practices of reparation, forgiveness and reconciliation – this approach can pro-
vide a framework with which to best consider them. 
10.2. What is an apology? What does it do? 
As apologies have become increasingly accepted in the public realm, taxonomies 
of apology have become increasingly complex. Theorists distinguish between col-
                                                            
4 Consider for example, the usually acerbic and critical Canadian columnist Rex 
Murphy, famous for his vigorous and spirited attacks on Canadian politicians. 
Murphy wrote of the Canadian apology: “the day of apology called from our 
sometimes all too predictable politicians a better version of themselves, gave them 
words and substance that may bring a hopeful new energy into play.  For once, 
then, yes, they have the benefit of every doubt.” (Murphy 2008). 
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lective and individual apologies (Tavuchis 1988, 48) and between contemporane-
ous and retrospective apologies (Weyeneth 2001, 20). They also take note of the 
kind of authority the apologizer is taken to have, whether representative, ceremo-
nial, corporate or celebrity, (Nobles 2008, 4) and of the identity of the individual 
or group demanding an apology in the first place, whether these are primary vic-
tims, their political representatives or indeed their descendants (Thompson 1992). 
The focus of these taxonomies is revealing: the status, import and even the func-
tion of a particular apology may vary along with the role or authority of the apolo-
gizer, the content of what is being apologized for, and the identity of the intended 
addressee. As these vary, so too does the meaning of the apology. 
But this does not yet tell us what an apology is, in general – if indeed a singular 
meaning can be taken from the wealth of examples available. So, for example, an 
apology is something we say or utter, in speech or writing, but it is also something 
we offer and that we offer to someone in particular; this is part of what distin-
guishes apology from confession. Furthermore apologies – and certainly political 
apologies – are usually performed on a certain occasion, in a certain context.  All 
of these factors contribute to whether or not we succeed in apologizing: the words 
we use, the timing and circumstances in which we say them, the person we offer 
them to, and what we are taken to be giving or offering that person in speaking at 
all. How ought we to go about theorizing apologies, so that we remain attentive to 
all these elements? 
For the most part, theorists have followed J.L. Austin in thinking of apologies 
as speech acts, that is, social actions “that can only be done with words and, by 
corollary, if [they] not done in the words, [they have] not been done” (Bavelas 
2004, 1). Nicolas Tavuchis refers to their “secular verbal magic” (Tavuchis 1988). 
But it is not clear that apologies are always done in words – and certainly, not the 
same words each time. In some close intimate relationships, much can be commu-
nicated with a single glance or gesture. Even in casual or formal relationships, it 
seems, “apologies can be communicated in a wide range of ways, through verbal 
statements issued publicly, joint declarations, legislative resolutions, documents 
and reports, legal judgments, pardon ceremonies, apology rituals, days of ob-
servance, reconciliation walks, monuments and memorials, even names bestowed 
on the landscape” (Weyeneth 2001, 20). But perhaps these other avenues are sub-
stitutes for words, or come to perform the function of words. If so, then apologies 
ultimately reduce to the communication of key propositions: “I’m sorry”, “I apol-
ogize”, “I was wrong” or “I hurt you”, “I won’t do it again”. 
To reduce apologies to their propositional content, even with the understanding 
that such content must be communicated, is to miss the extent to which apologies 
may be ritualistic and ceremonial, and to ignore how these non-verbal performa-
tive elements contribute to the meaning and success of the apology itself. Some 
theorists of apology have begun to recognize this fact. Sanderijn Cels argues that 
we should focus less on apologies as speech and more on apologies as perfor-
mances, drawing on the resources of dramaturgical theory to interpret their cere-
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monial significance.5 Nick Smith includes also includes performance among the 
elements of what he calls a ‘categorical apology:’ to his mind, the regulative ideal 
guiding our various practices of apologizing (Smith 2008, 74). Finally, Mark Gib-
ney and Erik Roxtrom argue for two non-vocal performative elements, ‘publicity’ 
and ‘ceremony,’ as crucial criteria for an authentic public apology (Gibney and 
Roxtrom 2001).  There is more to the import of apologies than what gets literally 
communicated; this is particularly true for the examples I consider, because of 
their status as official apologies. 
10.3. The Functions of An Apology 
In understanding apologies as speech, Austin assigns apologies to the class of 
behabitives: performatives concerned with attitudes and feelings (Austin 1975, 
83). 
But it is far from clear that feelings and attitudes are the primary things with 
which apologies concern themselves. Indeed, even when we consider apologies 
purely as speech acts – and not more broadly, as symbolic performances or dimen-
sions of repair – I would argue that emotions play only a secondary role in apolo-
gizing. They are not the main purpose of apologies, though they do, in many in-
stances, play a role in conveying or guaranteeing the success of that purpose. In 
fact, both political and personal apologies potentially aim to accomplish five 
things, not all of which are necessarily a matter of emotion.  Put differently, apol-
ogies have a narrative function (identifying the wrong, the wrongdoer and the vic-
tim) as well as expressing and performing the apologizer’s disavowal of her past 
acts and her commitment to some form of repair; they are thus simultaneously 
backwards and forwards looking.  Indeed, we can look to our examples to see how 
in apologizing, apologizer aims to accomplish most or all of the following five 
tasks: 
 
1. She identifies an act, or series of acts that took place, and character-
izes them as wrong, bad, harmful, injurious. That is, she locates the 
wrongdoing as such (this is not insignificant, especially in highly 
contested histories of events). 
 
This can be seen in both the Australian and the Canadian apologies: in the Aus-
tralian case, Rudd names the wrongfulness of past policies in the official motion, 
naming the “mistreatment of those who were Stolen Generations”, “the removal… 
of children”, and “the breaking up of families and communities.” In the longer 
speech that follows the motion, he goes into detail: first describing one individual 
history of a woman in the audience, Nanna Nungala Fejo, then offering specific 
                                                            
5 This point is taken from personal correspondence with Cels. For more infor-
mation on her work in progress on this topic, see 
http://cbuilding.org/about/bio/sanderijn-cels (last accessed March 23, 2010). 
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statistics, percentages, and dates, naming the Bringing Them Home report as an 
authoritative source for the stories and statistics, and also quoting some of the 
more reprehensible articulations of the policy at various points, as evidence for its 
racism (Rudd 2008).  The Canadian apology is shorter, but it also provides num-
bers, dates and other details in the very first two paragraphs, as well as the most 
infamous articulation of that policy, namely “to kill the Indian in the child.” It also 
details the conditions of the schools themselves, as well as the abuse suffered, and 
mentions ongoing detrimental effects: “The legacy of Indian Residential Schools 
has contributed to social problems that continue to exist in many communities to-
day.”6 
 
2. She takes on responsibility for these events and, in doing so, accepts 
(or takes on, in a representative capacity) the role of the wronging 
party, that is, the wrongdoer. 
 
In the case of official apologies, this is often the most controversial element, as 
political responsibility is closely linked both to material liability and, on occasion, 
to domestic or international criminal responsibility. In the Australian apology, this 
function emerges in two ways in the text of the official motion: first and directly, 
“We apologise for the laws and policies of successive Parliaments and govern-
ments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our fellow 
Australians.” – and then, in the repetitive litany of “for…we say sorry,” listing 
each harm inflicted. Rudd also forestalls any deflection of blame for past wrongs, 
by noting “this was happening as late as the early 1970s. The 1970s is not exactly 
a point in remote antiquity.”7 The most blunt statement of responsibility is the fol-
                                                            
6 Note also how, as a potential aim of apology, this narrative function is also a 
point of criticism: in apologizing for specific policies, both governments succeed 
in avoiding the broader question of apologizing for a much longer history of geno-
cidal appropriation and displacement. 
7 There is political and philosophical significance to this remark. One standard ob-
jection to official apologies concerns the difficulty of shouldering responsibility 
for distant injustices – and indeed, of applying contemporary moral standards to 
past eras.  In his response to Rudd’s motion, Australian Liberal Leader Brendan 
Nelson emphasized, “our generation does not own these actions, nor should it feel 
guilt for what was done in many, but not all cases, with the best of intentions” 
(Nelson 2008). Indeed, former PM John Howard refused to apologize for precisely 
these reasons: he argued that because the policies leading to the Stolen Genera-
tions did not violate domestic or international laws of their time, and did not con-
stitute gross human rights violations, they should not be judged by contemporary 
standards (Nobles 2008, 96).  To do so would be to inflict a kind of chronological 
colonialism of our own, he claimed, via the unfair imposition of alien moral 
standards.  Rudd’s history reminds his audience that the era of the Stolen Genera-
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lowing: “The uncomfortable truth for us all is that the parliaments of the nation, 
individually and collectively, enacted statutes and delegated authority under those 
statutes that made the forced removal of children on racial grounds fully lawful” 
(Rudd 2008). 
In this aspect, the Canadian apology is both less detailed and more equivocal. 
At first, Harper states: “In the 1870s, the federal government, partly in order to 
meet its obligation to educate Aboriginal children, began to play a role in the de-
velopment and administration of these schools.” Two phrases lessen the extent to 
which responsibility is taken: the reference to meeting an obligation (which 
sounds like an excusing or a justifying condition) and the idea of “playing a role”. 
While it is true that the schools were administered by the churches and only over-
seen by the government, this has the effect of seeming to ‘split hairs’ regarding re-
sponsibility for the policies. Luckily, the statement continues with a more accurate 
assertion of responsibility: “The Government of Canada built an education system 
in which very young children were often forcibly removed from their homes”. 
Furthermore, it is not only the policies that must be acknowledged as wrongful, 
but the worldview that motivated them: since, “these objectives were based on the 
assumption Aboriginal cultures and spiritual beliefs were inferior and unequal” 
(Harper 2008). 
 
3. She acknowledges what she takes to be the effect of her acts on the 
addressee or recipient of her apology; that is, she locates the ad-
dressee as the wronged party or victim. 
 
It might seem that the effects of the forcible removal of children, the separation 
of families and communities, and the systematic devaluing and destruction of a 
culture are obvious, and not in need of emphasis. But this is far from true: indeed, 
official apologies can play a crucial role in ceasing (or curbing) formal and infor-
mal practices of victim-blaming. In these examples, the present states of indige-
nous communities, still reeling from collective trauma, are taken out of their caus-
al and historical contexts (not to mention ongoing systemic injustice). In the case 
of the Canadian apology, for example, the experience was very nearly marred by 
the radio comments of a parliamentary secretary in Harper’s government, Pierre 
Poilievre, MP for Nepean-Carleton, who suggested just hours beforehand that the 
apology and subsequent reparations were wasted money, and that Canadians 
would do better to “engender the values of hard work and independence and self-
reliance” in indigenous communities.8 The 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples had emphasized, in its recommendations, how “acknowledging responsi-
                                                                                                                                        
tions is not alien. Australia’s signature on the UN Convention also undermines 
Howard’s position. 
8 Mr Poilievre subsequently apologized for his remarks in the House of Commons.  
See http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/12/poilievre-aboriginals.html (ac-
cessed March 25, 2010). 
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bility assists in the healing process because it creates room for dialogue” (Govier 
and Prager 2003, 68). Rudd’s speech describes these effects quite viscerally, in 
discussing the stories captured in the Bringing Them Home report:   
 
“The pain is searing; it screams from the pages. The hurt, the humiliation, the 
degradation and the sheer brutality of the act of physically separating a mother 
from her children is a deep assault on our senses and on our most elemental hu-
manity” (Rudd 2008).  
 
Harper is more circumspect, and – again – not without equivocation:  
 
“The government now recognizes that the consequences of the Indian Residen-
tial Schools policy were profoundly negative and that this policy has had a lasting 
and damaging impact on Aboriginal culture, heritage and language. While some 
former students have spoken positively about their experiences at residential 
schools, these stories are far overshadowed by tragic accounts of the emotional, 
physical and sexual abuse and neglect of helpless children, and their separation 
from powerless families and communities” (Harper 2008, italics added). 
 
There is a very real sense in which this nested minority report misses the point: 
the wrongness of the residential schools policy cannot be measured in terms of in-
dividual student satisfaction. Even if a majority of students had spoken positively, 
there is a very real sense in which the policy would still have been wrong. In qual-
ifying his description of the effects of the schools, Harper undermines the recogni-
tion mentioned above, namely, that the residential schools were wrong in objective 
as well as in practice. Furthermore, in alluding to a wide range of experiences at 
the schools, he also subtly displaces top-down responsibility, hinting that the bad 
experiences of some – or most – might well be attributed to particularly abusive 
‘bad apples’ in the schools themselves, and not a bad system. Finally, while there 
may be some appropriate time to celebrate the experiences of happier survivors, 
an official apology is simply not that moment. Of course, the Canadian apology 
does acknowledge suffering survivors, as the appropriate recipients of acknowl-
edgment, in a slightly different manner: 
 
“It has taken extraordinary courage for the thousands of survivors that have 
come forward to speak publicly about the abuse they suffered. It is a testament to 
their resilience as individuals and to the strength of their cultures.”9  
 
                                                            
9 This resembles a feature that, in his discussion of apologies, Louis Kort describes 
as a “gesture of respect” – additional words acknowledging the victim’s perspec-
tive, or some further indication of respect that counteracts the initial disrespect 
conveyed by the wrong itself (Kort 1975). 
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This acknowledgement is especially significant, since it notes how the burden 
of a culture of silence was also inflicted on survivors; it was left to them to come 
forward, to initiate justice, to demand what was rightly theirs. Harper goes on to 
say, “the burden of this experience has been on your shoulders for far too long. 
The burden is properly ours as a Government and as a country.” In other words, 
the absence of an apology and gestures of reparation  – up until this point – is it-
self an ongoing source of grievance and pain. 
 
4. She disavows her acts as wrongful. This may include expressions of 
remorse, agent-regret, guilt or shame. It may involve the identifica-
tion of individual wrongs, and explanations of why they are wrong 
(thus demonstrating an appropriate attitude to these wrongs in par-
ticular, and wrong acts or policies in general). 
 
Disavowal and repentance are a complicated business. To fully take responsi-
bility for the act, the agent must identify herself with the wrongdoings in some 
way, that is, she must own them. And yet – to disavow these acts – she must dis-
tance herself from them. At least in our interpersonal relationships with others, we 
achieve disavowal and distance from past actions in part through our attitudes to-
wards them. We experience and express remorse, guilt and shame, and the others 
test and measure our disavowal by the sincerity of these expressions.  
Of course, attitudes can be misleading, as Alice learns in hearing the story of 
the Walrus and the Carpenter (who lured and ate a number of oysters) from Twee-
dledum and Tweedledee, in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass: 
 
"I like the Walrus best," said Alice, "because you see he was a little sorry 
for the poor oysters." 
"He ate more than the Carpenter, though," said Tweedledee. "You see he 
held his handkerchief in front, so that the Carpenter couldn't count how 
many he took: contrariwise." 
"That was mean!" Alice said indignantly. "Then I like the Carpenter 
best—-if he didn't eat so many as the Walrus." 
"But he ate as many as he could get," said Tweedledum. 
This was a puzzler. After a pause, Alice began, "Well! They were both 
very unpleasant characters—-" (Carroll 1960, 237).10 
                                                            
10 In the edition of The Looking Glass annotated by logician Martin Gardner, 
Gardner somewhat officiously informs the reader in a footnote that in fact, Alice is 
puzzled because she faces the familiar dilemma of judging someone by their acts 
or their intentions. This footnote has always bothered me. Both the Walrus and 
Carpenter had fairly devious intentions and abhorrent actions (at least from an 
oyster-sympathizer’s perspective). Instead, Alice seems unsure about the end of 
the story: that is, their reactions in the aftermath of the crime – especially given 
Tweedledee and Tweedledums’ narrative additions and adjustments. What lies in 
11 
 
Clearly, the wrongdoer’s actual behavior also plays a crucial role in disavowal. 
But in interpersonal contexts, at least, feelings and attitudes cannot be discounted; 
most victims would regard a perfectly well behaved and reformed wrongdoer who 
nonetheless experienced no regret with suspicion and hostility. 
Feelings and attitudes cannot play the same role in official apologies as they do 
in interpersonal apologies, though this does not mean public figures have been 
unwilling to exploit them. Apology politics have emerged, in part, alongside a 
new ‘self-reflexive’ approach to political leadership, exemplified by charismatic 
figures like Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, or Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. Leaders are more willing to bare their souls, and their emotions: on camera, 
on talk shows, or on paper. Nevertheless, the irony of this supposedly ‘personal’ 
style of politics is apparent in an exhibit by Canadian artist Cathy Busby, titled 
Sorry. The exhibit consists of extremely large photographic prints of politician’s 
mouths, captures whilst ‘baring their souls’ in apology (in these cases, usually for 
their own, individual misdeeds).  In these photographs, the intimacy of the person-
al – here, represented visually by the close-up on a face – is hyper-accelerated by a 
camera that has zoomed in too far. Visual intimacy in extremis actually robs the 
speaker of recognizable identity, and thus of personhood: a mouth is just a mouth 
after all.  Lined next to one another on display, the apologizers are uniform, face-
less, and anonymous.  Busby’s images are far more impersonal than photographs 
taken at a distance, such as traditional formal photos of government officials en-
gaged in formal treaty negotiation, and the ‘souls’ that are supposedly bared are 
revealed so intimately that they become utterly soul-less. The text of each apology 
is printed only in excerpts: the artist’s comment on style over substance in the 
modern practice of political apology.11  
The sense that personal emotions have no place is compounded when the apol-
ogy is official.  The acknowledgment, disavowal and commitment necessary for a 
successful political apology cannot depend merely on the sentiments and feelings 
                                                                                                                                        
question is not the intention or action of the wrongdoers, but their stance following 
the wrongdoing – and, more broadly, what we do or do not want to see in a story 
of wrongdoing. 
11 Busby references both individual and official apologies, by both political and 
other public figures, and almost all her examples are for contemporaneous not ret-
rospective apologies. www.cathybusby.ca/sorry/ (accessed March 17, 2009).  In-
terestingly, Busby has chosen to represent the two apologies I focus on today very 
differently: in her latest exhibits, Righting the Wrongs and We are Sorry, Busby 
has imposed the texts of the apologies by the Canadian and Australian Prime Min-
isters along the front or side of public buildings.  The effect is very different from 
that of Sorry: the words of contrition literally cover the public face of a public 
building, suggesting that, in these cases, perhaps substance has trumped style [re-
productions of Righting the Wrongs and We are Sorry received from private corre-
spondence with the artist].  
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of the individual(s) who will utter it.  Whether or not the Canadian government 
faces its responsibility for a legacy of residential schools will not depend on PM 
Stephen Harper’s inner life.  The appearance of the wrong emotional tone can cer-
tainly cause a political apology to misfire, but it is not clear that the right tone can 
guarantee its success. 
In the absence of interpersonal feelings and attitudes, what appropriate moral 
motivation is there to drive political apologies? The cynical answer is, of course, 
that they lose meaning qua apologies altogether: because they are public, formal 
and pre-negotiated, they are empty gestures. This cynicism is not limited to aca-
demics and media commentators. Consider the following somewhat representative 
response to the Canadian government’s apology, taken from an online news fo-
rum:  
 
“I can’t believe it! Some of you are complaining that the apology didn’t have 
enough “emotion.”  What the heck did you want the [Prime Minister] to do… get 
all misty eyed and start crying/talking as he gave his speech…Many of these 
comments are made from people who can’t see the reality of the [public relations] 
value of this apology. The apology garners [sic] PC party support during the next 
election. Also the [sic] PC party made the apology because it was the politically 
correct thing to do… THAT’S IT.” 12 
 
Should we endorse this commentator’s assessment of the Canadian apology? 
Certainly, it is true that the motivations of political actors may be more complex 
than those of private individuals: politicians are elected to serve the interests of 
their constituents, after all, and not always for some wider moral purpose. Fur-
thermore, their own interests are very much bound up in continuing to serve that 
purpose, through re-election. Official apologies are the result of complex negotia-
tions and calculations. For this reason, we do better if we do not model political 
apologies too closely on the personal and emotional qualities of apologies made 
by individuals (Thompson 2008, 36), but look to other measurements of disavow-
al, based on their nature as official acts.  
In some sense, even uttering the word “apology” is a kind of disavowal. Gov-
ernments, unlike the Catholic Pope, do not claim infallibility – but neither are they 
known for rushing to admit mistakes.  Harper says “apology” twice in his speech, 
“apologize” four times, and “sorry” once. Rudd, in his longer speech, says “apolo-
gy” fourteen times, “apologise” five times, and “sorry” nine times. Unlike the Ca-
nadian government’s previous 1998 “Statement of Reconciliation” or the previous 
Australian government’s policy of “practical reconciliation” both aim at the idea 
                                                            
12 The comment wrongly identifies the governing party of Stephen Harper as the 
(now defunct) Progressive Conservative party, rather than the present-day Con-
servative Party of Canada. Posted by commonsenseman, 2008/06/12 at 1.12 PM 
ET, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/11/pm-
statement.html#articlecomments (accessed March 12, 2009).  
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of apologizing, explicitly.13 While this effect may fade as the ‘age of apology’ 
continues, it is still the case that government apologies possess sufficient novelty 
for this act, in itself, to indicate an important change of stance and policy. 
Furthermore, the authoritative articulation of right values can itself function as 
disavowal of widespread wrong values (Harvey 1995). In describing Australian 
Aboriginals as “a proud people… and a proud culture,” Rudd refuses to endorse 
stereotypes to the contrary. In identifying “reconciliation” as the expression of a 
“core value of our nation – … the value of a fair go for all”, and noting that a “fair 
go” was not had by the Aboriginals, Rudd – in his leadership capacity – puts the 
lie to any story to the contrary. Rudd describes collective encounter with “the 
cold, confronting, uncomfortable truth” of Australia’s history as the “wrestling 
with our own soul” and insists that as far as reconciliation and justice are con-
cerned, “old approaches are not working.” Thomas Brudholm writes, “a kind of 
reconciliation between peoples can build on a common refusal of reconciliation 
with the past” (Brudholm 2008, 116). Rudd’s speech returns, again and again, to 
the idea that the past has not passed, in many significant senses, that it remains 
something to be “wrestled with” and repaired. In refusing either to reconcile with 
the past, his words do much to disavow it. 
Harper’s apology relies partly on the image of a journey to express his disa-
vowal: “You have been working on recovering from this experience for a long 
time and in a very real sense, we are now joining you on this journey.” There is an 
appropriate humility in this expression. The metaphor is not unproblematic, how-
ever; Harper says, four times, “the Government of Canada now recognizes that it 
was wrong” or “we now recognize that it was wrong”, implying that Canadian 
failures were ones of (possibly culpable) moral ignorance and not knowing 
wrongdoing. Yet the “Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples” (1996) docu-
ments available testimony and evidence dating back to the early days of both poli-
cies, indicating the generally poor conditions at state-run schools and orphanages.  
In a 1907 report, for example, the Canadian Indian Affairs’ chief medical officer 
admitted, “50% of the children who passed through these schools did not live to 
benefit from the education which they have received therein” (Rolfsen 2009, 30). 
In other words, disavowal must be balanced with responsibility for both to avoid 
appearing disingenuous. 
The final element of an apology is the most forward-looking. Not coincidental-
ly, it is also the element that resists analysis in terms of speech.  For commitment 
in particular, it seems, contra Bavelas, apologies cannot be done only with words 
at all. The fifth function an apology may aim to perform is as follows: 
                                                            
13 The previous Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, consistently refused to 
issue an apology for the “Stolen Generations”, and instead advocated pursuing a 
policy of ‘Practical Reconciliation’: a vision of formal equality with no distinc-
tions in citizenship, with involved no land claims, no self-governance and few 
special rights for Aboriginal Australians, and which took no responsibility for the 
policies of past governments. 
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5. She commits herself to a future in which apologies are not necessary; 
that is, she commits herself to further appropriate acts and attitudes 
on her part (“I won’t do it again”). If appropriate, she may also indi-
cate a willingness to change things for the wronged party, either 
through amends and compensation, further gestures of respect, or 
perhaps the initiation of a more appropriate moral relationship.  
 
Both Rudd and Harper make commitments to a different future between indig-
enous and non-indigenous citizens, in their official apologies. Rudd speaks of a 
new “partnership” aimed at the very practical goals of closing the gap in life ex-
pectancy, literacy, numeracy, employment outcomes and opportunities – and sets 
some concrete goals for childhood health and education.  He also proposes that the 
commission established to achieve this might consider “the further task of consti-
tutional recognition of the first Australians”, suggesting a commitment to both 
symbolic and material change. Harper’s commitments on behalf of his govern-
ment are perhaps less voluntary, since they originate in the settlement agreement 
from a lawsuit, but he also refers to the implementation of this agreement as a new 
“partnership.” Indeed, the agreement included individual compensation packages, 
support for a general “healing fund” and other forms of commemoration, as well 
as a $60 million Truth and Reconciliation Commission, dedicated to uncovering 
the history of Indian Residential Schools, and making these stories known to non-
Indigenous Canadians.14 The commitments listed are not only practical; in naming 
aspects of the new partnership, Harper gestures towards “a relationship based on 
the knowledge of our shared history, a respect for each other, and a desire to move 
forward together with a renewed understanding that strong families, strong com-
munities and vibrant cultures and traditions will contribute to a stronger Canada 
for all of us.” 
10.4. Assessing Apologies 
As I mentioned above, my purpose in itemizing these features has been to 
demonstrate a given apology may have multiple purposes. First, there is a narra-
tive purpose: apologies identify the wrongdoing as such, the apologizer as respon-
sible for it, and the victim or addressee as wrongfully harmed by it. Second, apol-
ogies communicate and even demonstrate disavowal; in apologizing, the 
wrongdoer distances herself from her acts even as she takes responsibility for 
                                                            
14 In terms of individual compensation, the settlement specifies $10,000 for each 
student who attended a Residential School, with $3000 for each subsequent year 
of school. Individual settlements with survivors of sexual and physical abuse will 
be negotiated beyond these lump sums.  To my mind, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is one of the most exciting aspects of the settlement agreement and 
subsequent apology. 
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them, repudiating the attitudes, motivations, and circumstances that led her to per-
form them. Finally, apologies represent a form of commitment, both to the apolo-
gizer’s ongoing disavowal and her good-faith efforts to repair the wrongs as she is 
able and as is appropriate. Feelings and attitudes only appear as the vehicles for 
these primary functions. Remorse and guilt can communicate a sense of wrongdo-
ing and acknowledgment of its effects; such attitudes also motivate our desire to 
disavow past wrongs, and our intentions to be and behave otherwise, and to repair 
past wrongs. 
Not every element I have described is fore-grounded and explicit in every 
apologetic utterance – in our everyday lives, there is much we can take for granted 
or communicate non-verbally. But an utterance that failed even to imply any of 
these five things, or implied their opposite, would not be recognizable as an apol-
ogy; collectively, they shape the boundaries of our recognizable practices of apol-
ogy, even if instances of apology within those boundaries share only a family re-
semblance to one another. These features help us to distinguish apologies from 
close cousins like confessions, which need not identify the addressee as a victim, 
expressions of sympathy (“I’m sorry you feel that way”), which do not necessarily 
identify the speaker as the wrongdoer or the act as wrong, or even rueful or unre-
pentant admissions of fault (“I guess that’s just the way I am”), which fail to per-
form the distancing function of disavowal.  
Indeed, we can see just how each of these elements functions in locating prac-
tices of apology, if we consider a speech widely recognized to be a failure of 
apology: namely, the 1998 Canadian “Statement of Reconciliation.”15 Unlike the 
two 2008 examples, Stewart never utters the words “apology” or “apologize” and 
her single use of “sorry” is questionable. She does identify the wrongful harms of 
the past and their effects on indigenous culture and peoples, but both the second 
and fourth elements, i.e. taking responsibility as wrongdoer and disavowing past 
acts, are arguably absent. Stewart says that Canada must “recognize” and 
“acknowledge” the effects of its history, and she formally expresses “regret” at the 
actions of past governments, but that regret is never transformed into the admitted-
ly stronger terms of “responsibility,” “remorse” or even “guilt.”  The statement ra-
ther puzzlingly tells survivors of residential schools that “we wish to emphasize 
that what you experienced was not your fault and should never have happened,” a 
remark which – in this context – is almost patronizing, since it does not go on to 
take on that same fault (responsibility). While the statement does say, “to those of 
you who suffered this tragedy at residential schools, we are deeply sorry,” the 
word ‘sorry’ in this context is highly ambivalent and, it appears, intentionally so; 
it could express remorse, but equally, it could be merely sympathetic. Similarly, 
the use of “reconciliation” without responsibility has the effect of suggesting a 
purely forward-looking approach, or hints that past relationships have faltered be-
cause of mutual misunderstanding and not because of an asymmetrical relation-
                                                            
15 For a discussion of ‘non-apologies’ and ‘quasi-apologies’ in the Canadian con-
text, see the contribution by Matt James in Gibney et al (2008).  
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ship of injustice or oppression. It is hardly surprising that in Chief Fontaine’s re-
sponse to the 2008 apology, ten years later, he emphasizes, “finally, we heard 
Canada say it is sorry” (Fontaine 2008). 
Of the elements of an apology, the fifth and final – commitment – is perhaps 
the most contentious. There are certainly interpersonal apologies that fail to com-
municate this element, or to communicate it sincerely, while still being recogniza-
ble as apologies.  In the case of chronic re-offenders, who know they cannot in 
good conscience promise to be different, but nonetheless acknowledge and disa-
vow their behavior – no doubt experiencing a high degree of self-loathing and al-
ienation as a result – we may recognize the helpless “I wish I could say I won’t do 
it again, but I can’t” as a kind of apology, albeit one marred by self-conflict and 
moral dissonance. What is interesting in these cases is that the apologizer appears 
to be apologizing for who she is, and no longer what she has done.16  Indeed, this 
may explain why official apologies, unlike interpersonal apologies, are held to 
stricter standards of commitment: we have little sympathy for a chronically re-
offending state, and would have trouble understanding what it meant that such a 
state simply could not subject itself to appropriate reforms and reparation.  
Thus, I would suggest that when we approach the assessment of apologies (in 
any context), it is important first to take into account what Austin’s categorization 
overlooks: namely their narrative and their commissive functions. Apologies have 
a historical or recording function; they tell a particular kind of story about the 
events apologized for, and the participants’ role in them. They also have a future-
oriented commissive function; in apologizing, I often implicitly or explicitly at-
tempt to persuade you that I am not likely to do this again – indeed, that I am not 
the kind of person to do this again. In political and in personal contexts of contest-
ed histories and the ongoing need for mutually acceptable coexistence, these may 
come to play a primary role in the success and assessment of the apology itself. 
Furthermore, the fact that apologies have multiple functions is significant for 
their assessment.  It is not clear that each element of the apology, or its purpose, 
will be equally important in all cases.   So, for example, where there is significant 
dispute over what actually took place or when the apology follows a long period 
of time in which the wrongs were covered over or denied, the most important as-
pect of the apology for all concerned may be its narrative function: getting clear 
on who did what, to whom, and when.  In other instances, when these details are 
not in dispute, the roles of disavowal or commitment may come to the fore.  
The measurement of each potential function will be highly particularistic; what 
counts as an appropriate narrative, or a satisfying expression of disavowal, or even 
a sufficient commitment for the future, will depend on the nature and extent of the 
wrong, the pre-existing relationship between apologizer and recipient, and other 
features of the context, including broader social norms surrounding social status, 
the taking of responsibility, rituals of apology and acceptable moral relationships. 
The upshot of these two features – the multiple functions of apologies and the con-
                                                            
16 For an interesting and related discussion, see Bell (2008). 
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textual way in which these functions apply – is that there is no overarching singu-
lar standard, that is, an ‘ideal’, ‘paradigmatic’ or ‘categorical’ apology against 
which all individual apologies ought to be measured.17 Our practices of apologiz-
ing are simply too varied, and the norms they obey too tied to contextual features, 
for such an ideal to function fairly and universally. 
10.5. Assessing Official Apologies: Some Complications 
Are there aspects of official apologies, beyond their multiple and contextual func-
tions – a feature they share with interpersonal apologies, after all – that prevent us 
from easily assessing them? Why is it harder to pick out appropriate measures of 
narration, disavowal and commitment in political contexts? Certainly, government 
apologies, like individual apologies, can recount appropriate narratives of wrong, 
responsibility and harm.  Both the Australian and the Canadian example employed 
narrative imagery in their opening phrases:  Harper described the Residential 
Schools as a “sad chapter” and Rudd a “dark chapter”.  Rudd also resolved, “that 
this new page in the history of our great continent can now be written.” Few Ca-
nadians had challenged so-called ‘common wisdom’ (i.e. gross stereotypes and 
misunderstandings) about poverty, laziness, and substance addiction in Native 
communities – or connected it to the fact that a generation of sexual-abuse survi-
vors, isolated from all their cultural and community resources as children, is now 
raising a second generation of children themselves (Rolfsen 2008, 31).  Chief Fon-
taine noted that following the apology, 73% of Canadians surveyed were aware of 
the apology, and of those, 83% supported it (Fontaine 2008b).18  The apologies, in 
naming the wrongs done to generations of indigenous children, succeed in re-
                                                            
17 Here I part ways from two recent influential treatments of the topic: Charles 
Griswold’s (2007) treatment of apologies Nick Smith’s concept of the categorical 
apology as normative ideal (Smith 2008). 
18 Several indigenous commentators on a comment thread on the CBC news web-
site echoed this sentiment: the most moving aspect of the apology was that, for the 
first time, their non-indigenous friends and neighbors were curious about residen-
tial schools and their experiences. See comments posted at 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/11/pm-statement.html.  When asked by 
journalist Rolfsen what white Canadians can do “to repair what’s broken?” Cana-
dian Aboriginal Lyana Patrick answered, “Listening would be great. Listening 
would be great.” (Rolfsen, 32). 
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counting their history.19 Indeed, testimonial responses to the Australian apology 
emphasized this acknowledgment.20 
More contentious are the latter two functions: it is not clear what plays the 
analogous role in political life that feelings and attitudes do in personal relation-
ships. What appropriately demonstrates the disavowal and commitment of a gov-
ernment, rather than of a single individual?  What would give us reason to trust or 
to doubt the motivations behind expressions of disavowal and commitment made 
by Rudd and Harper? Plausible candidates include the success of the material 
compensation and commitments offered, the effect of changes to the historical 
record, the affective responses of addressees and witnesses, or perhaps whatever 
renegotiated political relationship emerges from those initial responses.  
Material compensation appears to be an obvious source of measurement; as 
some have argued, “questions of social justice and legal liability cannot and 
should not be separated” (MacDuff, 1).  Indigenous groups criticized the Australi-
an government for not attaching a compensation package to the apology. 21  While 
the Canadian government’s apology was issued alongside material reparations 
payments and a comprehensive settlement agreement, it was also expressed by a 
government who had recently slashed funding to First Nations communities, re-
jected the Kelowna accord, promising $1billion for anti-poverty initiatives, mental 
health programs and clean water, and signed by the previous, less overtly apolo-
getic, government, and they stalled a number of land claims negotiations. If we 
look to material measurements of apology, the verdict is still out on whether either 
apology has successfully disavowed the past or lived up to its promised commit-
ments. 
                                                            
19 That it was a government and not an indigenous voice who successfully re-
counted the history raises entirely different questions of appropriation and silenc-
ing. But it is important to remember that when governments tell stories, they get 
heard. 
20 One woman recounted how she remembered being identified by number and not 
name in a state-run orphanage, given an arbitrary collective birthday and a uni-
form token present. She notes the apology with its emphasis on survivor stories 
was “a final kind of recognition that I exist. My name is Veronica Ann McDon-
ald.” http://www.qldstories.slq.qld.gov.au/home/digital_stories/apology_responses 
21 "In fact, that there has been a denial of any [sic] monetary or any compensation 
that has been talked about in our country, I think is a blight on our history. I think 
it is morally correct to offer some olive branch here in terms of compensation." 
Jackie Huggins, deputy director of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies at 
the University of Queensland and a former co-chair of Reconciliation Australia, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/02/13/2161979.htm (accessed March 19, 
2009). 
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On the other hand, the scope of political responsibility is not exhausted by no-
tions of legal liability or rectificatory compensation.22 Neither can the significance 
of an apology cannot be reduced to its attached reparations; after all, there are vic-
tims who reject reparations unless accompanied by some form of apology.  The 
symbolic features of apology matter as much as the material features do.   
Both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians commented consistently that 
the most moving aspect of the apology was the sight of Chief Phil Fontaine of the 
Assembly of First Nations (the political body representing over 50 native tribes) 
standing on the floor of the parliament in full ceremonial headdress, alongside 
leaders from Canada’s Métis and Inuit populations.  This was the first time native 
leaders had been overtly invited onto the floor of the house in their capacity as 
representatives of nations, and had been granted permission to speak in that capac-
ity. As one commentator remarked, “Never discount the energy and communica-
tive power of symbolism and ceremony.  Chief Fontaine’s speech was a power in 
itself, the best of the day… Wearing the appurtenances of his office, standing in 
that chamber, in the company of other aboriginal leaders… he embodied the occa-
sion” (Murphy 2008).   
Receiving and responding to a formal apology, when that was understood as a 
gesture between political bodies and peoples, not individuals, cemented recogni-
tion in Canadian consciousness that the Assembly of First Nations was a political 
body, deserving of formal address, in a way that expressions of feelings could not 
do alone.23 In a later speech, Chief Fontaine spoke movingly of what it meant “to 
be on the floor of the House of Commons – to speak in one’s own voice, in one’s 
own right (capacity) to the country…” (Fontaine 2008b). In other words, it wasn’t 
the speech – or the speaking – of apology itself that achieved the third function, 
that of recognizing and acknowledging the apology’s addressee.  The recognition 
required, in this instance, was symbolic and political.  It could only be achieved by 
the apology as public ceremony. Since part of the harm done to Canada’s indige-
nous peoples had been the refusal of such recognition, this also represented (at 
least) symbolic disavowal of past policies of paternalism and disrespect.  
                                                            
22 In fact, because the responsibility and recognition expressed in apologies is not 
necessary tied to material compensation, even those who reject the idea of histori-
cal reparations may still accept apologetic or symbolic gestures. Jeremy Waldron 
– who famously argued that commitments to present-day distributive justice 
supercede the claims of historic injustice – acknowledges that his point applies on-
ly to proportionate reparation payments understood as rectificatory justice. Small-
er payments attached to apology or other symbolic gestures “symbolize a society’s 
undertaking not to forget or deny that a particular justice took place” (Waldron 
1992, 6). 
23 Perhaps for this very reason, whether or not the native leaders would be allowed 
to speak from the floor was a hotly contested issue, almost until the last minute.  It 
was largely because of the intervention of an opposition party – the left-leaning 
New Democratic Party – the government eventually relented. 
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Measuring the need for symbolic gestures of reparation against material and fi-
nancial is difficult. There is understandable fear that, unless apologies are neces-
sarily tied to reparations, the symbolic nature of apology replaces or circumvents 
other material efforts to repair damage.  Of course, this only holds true if apolo-
gies are taken to be a complete response to historic injustice in themselves, and not 
a component of a broader project, indeed, a component that can actually bind gov-
ernments to further action. If part of what an apology accomplishes is commit-
ment, then we are right to measure the success of apology in part by what exactly 
is committed. In both these cases, that commitment was in part material, and un-
fortunately, it remains very much in question. 
Recognizing the functions of an apology and learning to evaluate them in terms 
of those functions is not a guarantee that every good or successful apology is 
without political risk. For one thing, an apology is, by definition, a wrongdoer’s 
narrative, and thus it remains to some extent within the wrongdoer’s control. She 
still controls the story being told, even if that story involves her best effort to sym-
pathetically incorporate and acknowledge the victim’s perspective. Even the most 
well-intentioned of wrongdoers will dwell just a little too long on the state of their 
own soul, while castigating it; there is something peculiarly narcissistic in a too-
repentant apologizer.24 Furthermore, an apology does not simply perform one’s 
(prior) guiltiness. Through the ability to narrate that wrongfulness as wrong, and 
through the expression of disavowal and one’s commitment to that disavowal, it 
also performs one’s (current) rightfulness – or at least, one’s right thinking-ness.  
As Elizabeth Spelman says, apology is a vehicle “for vice nested in virtue”, and it 
allows the apologizer to “wrap herself in a glorious mantle of rehabilitation” 
(Spelman 2002, 96-97).  In doing so, apologies may redirect us from – and even 
foreclose – other investigations into the misdeeds and motivations of the past, 
shutting down further inquiry. 
Finally, while the call for apology demands something of the wrongdoer, the 
apology itself may return that demand to the victim. The Canadian apology asks 
“… the forgiveness of the Aboriginal peoples of this land for failing them so pro-
foundly”. This request jars with the earlier, humbler acknowledgment that non-
indigenous Canadians have only just joined indigenous survivors on a journey of 
recovery – forgiveness, if relevant at all, seems a little premature. It is telling that 
Chief Fontaine’s eloquent response bears no mention of the word forgiveness.  
While he ends by reaching out to all Canadians in a spirit of reconciliation, he 
does so by noting: “we still have to struggle.” Rudd’s speech makes no mention of 
forgiveness, although he asks that, “the apology be received in the spirit in which 
it is offered” and further, he states, “it is time to reconcile.” 
                                                            
24 Columnist Salutin described how, leading up to the 2008 apology, “there was a 
smug sense on the part of some apologizers that it’s all about us.  CTV’s Dan 
Matheson asked Mike Duffy, ‘Do you think we are ready as a people to say we are 
guilty?’ ‘Oh I think we are, Dan’ cogitated Duff” – much like sports commenta-
tors assessing our chances for making the playoffs this year (2008). 
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Grasping this danger requires that we reflect on the differences between re-
questing or even demanding a response, on the one hand, and providing an oppor-
tunity to be heard, on the other. After all, the chance to respond is sometimes a re-
lief to victims. Precluding a response from the victims is just as much a danger for 
official apologies, if the apologizer is given the last public word on the subject. 
The apology then reinforces the original harm of silence, exclusion and being spo-
ken for.  One Australian columnist remarked,   
 
“Throughout the coverage of the apology, I couldn't shake the sense that the in-
digenous Australians included in the televised spectacle - whether invited guests 
in Parliament House or the dozens of emotion-filled faces from around the country 
- were little more than props. Their role was to express and register the emotional 
content of the event.  But the apology was not intended for them. The true recipi-
ents of the apology were those white Australians who watched and wanted to be 
made to feel as if they had taken part in something good…"25 
 
The most contested aspect of the Canadian apology was the last-minute negoti-
ations to allow the Chiefs to speak from the floor of the Parliament. In both cases, 
it seems, the danger was not the demand for a response, but the refusal to allow 
one.  Recounting one’s sins may provide an inner glow, but listening to someone 
else recount them is far more uncomfortable.  There was a distinct and collective 
intake of breath in Canada, when Chief Fontaine said “racist policy”. 
One final danger of political apologies emerges from their narrative power and 
their potential character as already-identified stories of closure and change. Both 
government apologies mention “new partnerships” between Aboriginals and non-
Aboriginals, going forward. Yet the language of reconciliation, often appealed to 
in apology, suggests the revitalization of an old relationship, not the beginning of 
a new one. In Harper’s apology, the first mention of the word ‘apology’ is: “The 
government recognizes that the absence of an apology has been an impediment to 
healing and reconciliation,” and in the final paragraph “healing, reconciliation and 
resolution” are named as the express goals of the settlement agreement.  But as 
Gerry Oleman, a residential school survivor and community support worker re-
marks, “I think reconciliation is the wrong word.  When have we been in harmo-
ny? I don’t think we’ve had a relationship we’re going to mend” (Rolfsen 2008, 
30).  Thus the value of both apologies may depend to a large extent on how new 
the relationship forged really is: as measured out in political and civic recognition, 
and in equal conditions and opportunities for civic life and cultural flourishing. 
                                                            
25 Scott Stephens, “The Apology and the Moral Significance of Guilt,” 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/02/25/2171795.htm (accessed March 20, 
2009) 
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10.6. Conclusions: Apologies and their Aftermath 
It seems unlikely that we will ever have purely theoretical grounds for judging one 
apology an unqualified success, morally or politically speaking, and another a 
failure. In this paper, I have focused on two recent apologies by heads of govern-
ment and directed towards representative bodies of each nation’s indigenous peo-
ples. Moreover, I have argued, these two examples demonstrate the complications 
inherent in understanding and assessing official apologies. In both cases, it is not 
clear that success or failure in apologizing is something that can be drawn from 
the text itself or even its ceremonial context – some serious concerns cannot be re-
solved within the space of a speech or a text, and will very much depend on what 
happens next for Canada and Australia’s indigenous peoples.  And yet, the signifi-
cance and meaning of the apology as performed text does not disappear when we 
acknowledge this. The various strengths and weaknesses of both apologies high-
lighted here do matter and have mattered to those who received them and those 
who witnessed them.  Identifying how these strengths and weaknesses play out 
along axes of narrative, disavowal and commitment – even while recognizing that 
these shift and overlap, according to each particular circumstance – goes some 
way towards untangling and deciphering the meaning, the relative successes and 
the shortcomings of both.   Reorienting our approach to apologies in this way al-
lows us to see tremendous potential in these two recent apologies, without assum-




List of References 
 
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Austin, J.L. 1975. How to do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bavelas, Janet. 2004. An Analysis of Formal Apologies By Canadian Churches to First Nations. 
Occasional Paper presented to the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, University of 
Victoria. web.uvic.ca/psyc/bavelas/2004ChurchApol.pdf. Accessed 4 November 2011. 
Bell, Macalester. 2008. Forgiving Someone for Who They Are (and Not Just What They’ve 
Done). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 625-658. 
1997. Bringing them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families. 
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/Social_Justice/bth_report/report/index.html. Accessed 4 No-
vember 2011. 
Busby, Cathy. Sorry. www.cathybusby.ca. Accessed March 17, 2009. 
Campbell, Sue. Challenges to Memory in Political Contexts: Recognizing Disrespectful Chal-
lenges. Discussion Paper for the Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (obtained from private correspondence). 
Card, Claudia. 2007. Genocide and Social Death. In Claudia Card and Armen T. Marsoobian, 
Genocide’s Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair. New York: Blackwell. 
Cunningham, Michael. 2004. Apologies in Irish Politics: A Commentary and Critique. Contem-
porary British History 18 (4): 80-92. 
23 
Davis, Paul. 2002. On apologies. Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 169–173. 
Dueck, Lorna. 2000. Sorry Isn’t Good Enough. Globe and Mail. October 31. 
http://www.listenuptv.com/lorna/native.htm. Accessed 18 March 2009.  
Fontaine, Phil, Chief of the Assembly of First Nations. Response to Canadian Government 
Apology, June 11, 2008. 
http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=18133d91-b8aa-4fbe-956e-
20298d79c1d5. Accessed 18 March 2009. 
––––––– 2008. Justice, Responsibility, and reconciliation: Legacies of the Holocaust and the 
Persecution of Aboriginal Canadians. Talk given at Ryerson University as part of Holocaust 
Awareness Week, November 3, 2008. 
Fricker, Miranda. 2003. Epistemic Justice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing. 
Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2) (January 1): 154-173.  
Gibney, Mark, and Erik Roxstrom. 2001. The Status of State Apologies. Human Rights Quarter-
ly 23 (4): 911-939.  
Gibney, Mark, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Niklaus Steiner. 2007. The 
Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past. University of Pennsylvania Press, October 24. 
Gill, Kathleen. 2000. The Moral Functions of an Apology. The Philosophical Forum 31 (1) 
(March): 11-27.  
Govier, Trudy, and Wilhelm Verwoerd. 2002. The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology. Journal of 
Social Philosophy 33 (1): 67-82.  
Griswold, Charles. 2007. Forgiveness: a philosophical exploration. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Harper, Stephen, Right Honourable, Prime Minister of Canada. 2008. Statement of Apology to 
former students of Indian Residential Schools. June 
11.www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/TextofApology.pdf . Accessed 4 November 2011. 
Canada, and René Dussault. 1996. People to people, nation to nation  : highlights from the report 
of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. [Ottawa]: The Commission. 
Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement. 
http://www.residentialschoolsettlement.ca/settlement.html. Accessed 4 November 2011. 
King, Thomas. 2003. The Truth About Stories: A Native Narrative. Toronto: Anansi Press. 
Kort, Louis F. “What is an Apology?” Philosophy Research Archives 1 (2975) 80-87. 
Lazare, Aaron. 2004. On Apology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Llewellyn, Jennifer J. 2002. Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential Schools in Canada: 
Litigation, ADR, and Restorative Justice. University of Toronto Law Journal 52: 253-300. 
MacDuff, Anne. 2008. Do Sorry Statements Make You Liable? The Australian Legal Context. 
Forgiveness: Probing the Boundaries (First Global Conference), Salzburg, Austria. 
Metcalfe, Robin. 2005. Up Close and Personal. In Sorry, ed. Cathy Busby. Halifax: St Mary’s 
Art Gallery. 
Moon, Claire. 2004. Prelapsarian State: Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Transitional Justice. 
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 17 (2004) 185-197. 
Murphy, Rex. 2008. “The Day the House Stood Still.” Globe and Mail, Saturday June 14. 
Nelson, Brendan, Leader of the Australian Liberal Party. 2008. “Response to Government Apol-
ogy.” February  13. Reprinted online in The Australian 
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23206522-5013172,00.html. Accessed 
17 March 2009. 
Nobles, Melissa. 2008. The Politics of Official Apologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Prager, Carol Anne Leuchs, and Trudy Govier. 2003. Dilemmas of reconciliation: cases and 
concepts. Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press. 
Rolfsen, Catherine. 2008. After The Apology. This Magazine. September/October. 
Rudd, Kevin, Right Honourable, Prime Minister of Australia. 2008. Apology to Australia’s In-
digenous Peoples. February 13. www.aph.gov.au/house/rudd_speech.pdf. Accessed 18 March 
2009. 
24  
Salutin, Rick. 2008. Issues of Apology and Power. Globe and Mail. Friday June 13. 
Smith, Andrea. 2005. Conquest: Sexual Violence and the American Indian Genocide. Cam-
bridge: South End Press. 
Smith, Nick. 2008. I Was Wrong: The Meaning of Apologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Solomon, Deborah. 2004. The Way We Live Now: Questions for Kenneth Pollack. New York 
Times Magazine. October 24. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E4DC103AF937A15753C1A9629C8B6
3. Accessed 18 March 2009. 
‘Sorry’: the unfinished business of the Bringing Them Home report” Background Note. Parlia-
mentary Library, National Parliament of Australia. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/BN/2007-08/BringingThemHomeReport.htm. Accessed 
12 March 2009. 
Spelman, Elizabeth. 2002. Repair: The Impulse to Restore in a Fragile World.  Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Stewart, Jane, Honourable, Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs. 1998. Statement of Recon-
ciliation on behalf of Canada’s Government to Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples. January 7. 
http://www.deal.org/content/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=889&Itemid=1
082. Accessed 18 March 2009. 
Tavuchis, Nicolas. 1990. Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Thompson, Janna. 1992. Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparations and Historical Injus-
tice. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
–––––– 2008. Apology, Justice and Respect: A Critical Defense of the Political Apology. In The 
Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past, edited by Mark Gibney et al. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 1992. The Supercession of Historical Injustice. Ethics 103 (1): 4-28.  
Weyeneth, Robert R. 2001. The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical Reconciliation. 
The Public Historian 23 (3): 9-30. 
 
